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Abstract
Recent studies on the evolutionary dynamics of the Prisoner’s Dilemma game in scale-free networks have
demonstrated that the heterogeneity of the network interconnections enhances the evolutionary success of
cooperation. In this paper we address the issue of how the characterization of the asymptotic states of the
evolutionary dynamics depends on the initial concentration of cooperators. We find that the measure and
the connectedness properties of the set of nodes where cooperation reaches fixation is largely independent
of initial conditions, in contrast with the behavior of both the set of nodes where defection is fixed, and the
fluctuating nodes. We also check for the robustness of these results when varying the degree heterogeneity
along a one-parametric family of networks interpolating between the class of Erdo¨s-Renyi graphs and the
Baraba´si-Albert networks.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Evolutionary dynamics has proved to be a useful theory to describe evolution of biological
systems at all levels of organization [1]. Rooted in the basic tenet of Darwinism, the replicator
dynamics [2, 3, 4] of evolutionary game theory provides an elegant mathematical description of
how natural selection among (phenotypes) strategies takes place when the reproductive success of
individuals (and then the future abundance, i.e. frequency, of strategies) depends on the current
phenotypic composition of the population (frequency-dependent fitness). In this regard, one of
the current theoretical challenges to the explanatory powers of evolutionary game dynamics is the
understanding of the observed evolutionary survival of cooperative behavior among individuals
when selfish actions provide a higher benefit (fitness). Perhaps the best suited (and most used)
model to formally describe the puzzle of how cooperation arises is the Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD),
a two-players-two-strategies game, where each player chooses one of the two available strategies,
cooperation or defection: A cooperator receives R when playing with a cooperator, and S when
playing with a defector, while a defector earns P when playing with a defector, and T against a
cooperator. When T > R > P > S, the game is a PD. Given this payoff ordering, in a well-mixed
(unstructured) population where each agent interacts with all other agents (or a representative
sample of the population composition), defectors are fitter and thus the fraction of cooperators
asymptotically vanishes.
Among the various mechanisms that have been proposed to explain how natural selection can
lead to cooperative behavior (like kin selection, group selection, direct or indirect reciprocity) [5],
a simple one is based on leaving off the well-mixed population hypothesis, so that each individual
only interacts with agents in its neighborhood, as specified by some graph or network of ”social”
interactions. Agent-based-modelling approaches [6] of this kind in Theoretical Biology [7], Eco-
nomics [8] and Social Sciences [9] often benefit in a natural way from Statistical Physics methods,
concepts and techniques (also scientists), so favoring fruitful (synergic) interdisciplinary (socio-,
bio-, econo-) physics research [10], often termed Physics of Complex Systems [11, 12].
Early pioneering numerical work [13] on the PD game in two-dimensional square lattices, made
the observation that, unlike in unstructured populations, cooperators and defectors can coexist in
the lattice indefinitely. In [13] each individual node played with its immediate neighbors each
time step accumulating a payoff, then updated its strategy by imitating the one of highest payoff
in its neighborhood, including itself (best-takes-over reproduction rule) and back again for very
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large times. When passing from a ”mean field” (well mixed population) interaction description
to a lattice structure of interactions, one has to specify various details (of varying importance) on
both, a) the lattice characteristics, e.g. regular or not, randomness of various kinds, finite size
effects, etc., and b) the specific form of the microscopic dynamics of reproduction process, e.g.
deterministic rules or probabilistic ones, synchronous or asynchronous updating, what types of
stochastic fluctuations are allowed, etc. The study of many, if not most, of important aspects of
the issue have generated for more than a decade a wealthy literature, of a great interest from the
Statistical Physics perspective (e.g., [14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28]; for
a recent review, see [10], where an extensive list of references can be found).
Nowadays, the existence of cooperation-promoting feedback mechanisms that are rooted deep
into the interaction structure is indisputably accepted. It has been termed spatial, or lattice reci-
procity, in analogy to direct reciprocity (through iterated game strategies) and indirect reciprocity
(through reputation, or scoring, of agents). Simply said, the clustering of cooperators in the lattice
could provide high enough fitness to the cooperator nodes exposed to invasion, to the extent of pre-
serving cooperators from evolutionary extinction, even when defection is blatantly favored by the
one-shot (two-players) game analysis. For negligible values of P − S ≃ 0, when T −R increases
from zero cooperation decreases slowly, and becomes zero at values of (T/R) − 1 well beyond
zero. The region (in parameter space) of coexistence of strategists is the genuine battlefield where
the competition between strategies adopts interesting, non-trivial aspects: The transition region
between two clear-cut phases, i.e. all-cooperators (all-C) prevailing at T/R ≃ 1, and all-defectors
(all-D) at higher values of T/R. More recently, a set of works have extended this perspective
to a most intriguing and ubiquitous class of networks, say scale-free networks, a ”focuss issue”
nowadays.
There is an accumulated evidence that many real biological [29, 30], social [31] and techno-
logical [32, 33, 34] systems are neither regular nor simplest random graphs (not to say well-mixed
populations) of entities or agents, but they are described by some distinctive metric (path length
based) and topological (structure and size of local neighborhoods) properties. They often show a
so-called scale-free (SF) distribution density of degree, P (k) ∼ k−γ , where the degree k of a node
is the number of connections it shares with its neighbors [35, 36], so their connectivity patterns de-
part considerably from lattice homogeneity (lacking of a sharp characteristic scale of connectivity).
The ubiquity and importance of complex networks raised quite naturally the question of how natu-
ral selection works on top of different types of complex networks of agents [19, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41].
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In this case (as in other nonlinear dynamical processes in networks [42, 43]) one has to deal with
two sources of complexity, the evolutionary dynamics and the complex structure of the substrate,
which are entangled. Interestingly, the sort of processes that evolutionary game dynamics is aimed
to model may well be very relevant to understand real networked systems through the study of a
variety of scenarios of co-evolution of both strategies (phenotype survival) and network (evolving
topological features)[38]. Among other works exploring various aspects on the evolution in com-
plex networks, see [44, 45, 46]. From here we focuss attention on fixed network settings and how
degree heterogeneity influences evolutionary dynamics of PD.
Some recent extensive numerical works on PD (and closely related) games [39, 40, 41] on SF
networks, using probabilistic updating rule (random neighbor pair-comparison, and update with
probability proportional to fitness difference) have shown that the absence of a sharp characteristic
scale of degree in the network greatly enhances the ”lattice reciprocity” mechanisms of evolu-
tionary survival of cooperation. For example, highly connected (hubs) cooperator nodes have
the chance of high payoffs and resist well invasion by easily invading less connected neighbors,
which in turn increase hub’s payoffs and invading capabilities [40]; this positive feedback mecha-
nism does not operate in the case of defector hubs and illustrates in a simple way one of the biasing
effects of graph heterogeneity.
In a recent exploration of these heterogeneity based cooperation-promoting mechanisms, us-
ing the kind of implementation of replicator dynamics on graphs specified above in the previous
paragraph, one observes generically [41] that fixation of the cooperation (as well as defection)
strategy on certain nodes occurs after (often-not-large) sensible transients, so that any asymptotic
trajectory of population states defines a partition of the network into three sets: the set C of nodes
where cooperation is fixed, the setD of nodes where defection is fixed, and the setF of fluctuating
nodes that experience forever cycles of invasion by the competing strategies. In other words, the
observed stationary value of the average fraction c¯ of cooperators (see definition in section 3), in
any asymptotic (long-term) trajectory, has two additive contributions: a) the relative size µ(C) of
the set of pure cooperators, and b) the overall fraction of time T¯c spent by fluctuating nodes as
cooperators, weighted by its relative size µ(F), say
c¯ = µ(C) + µ(F)T¯c (1)
The analysis of global connectedness inside the sets C andD of fixed strategy nodes reveals that
the lack of a significant characteristic scale of degree is neatly associated to a simply connected
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C set, while D is fragmented into many clusters in the wide transition region (coexistence of
strategies) between asymptotic uniform (µ(C) = 1, all-C, and µ(D) = 1, all-D) equilibria. This
structure ofD in the strategies coexistence regime is similar to that exhibited by both C and D sets
for the Erdo¨s-Renyi random class of networks (i.e. with Poissonian distribution density of degrees,
and thus a significant characteristic scale: the network average degree) [41]. All previous results
[41], were obtained for a unbiased (50%) initial proportion of (randomly placed) cooperators, for
all the analyzed stochastic trajectories.
In this paper, we are interested in exploring the robustness of these observations reported in
[41] on the behavior of the partition sets, for a limiting one-parameter form of the PD game, say
P − S = 0: the border with the Snowdrift game (see next section). Robustness against parameter
P − S variation, and others, will be analyzed elsewhere [49]. In particular, we focus here on two
aspects of robustness: First, the influence of varying initial fraction of cooperators on the network
partition sets (C, D, F ) of asymptotic trajectories. The model, its dynamical rules and structural
characteristics, as well as the necessary technical details, are the contents of section II. The results
are described and analyzed in section III. Second, in section IV, we show how those observed
behaviors of the partition vary along an interpolating family of networks whose heterogeneity can
be one-parametric tuned, from ER limit to BA limit, that is, we check robustness against decreasing
heterogeneity of the network. Conclusions and some prospective remarks can be found in ending
section V.
II. THE MODEL
The Prisoner’s Dilemma game is defined in its more general form by the payoff matrix:

 R S
T P

 (2)
where the element aij is the payoff received by an i-strategist when playing against a j-strategist,
with i = 1 meaning cooperator, and i = 2 defector. The payoff ordering is given by T > R >
P > S. Other payoff orderings have received other names, e.g. T > R > S > P corresponds
to the so-called Snowdrift (or Hawks and Doves, or Chicken) game. Following several studies
[13, 39], the PD payoffs have been set to R = 1 (so the reward for cooperating fixes the payoff
scale), T = b > 1, P = 0 (no benefit under mutual defection), and P − S = ǫ = 0. This last
choice places us in the very frontier of PD game. It has the effect of not favoring any strategy when
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playing against defectors (while being advantageous to play defection against cooperators). Small
positive values of the parameter ǫ≪ 1 leads to no qualitative differences in the results [13, 39, 49],
so the limit ǫ→ 0+ is agreed to be continuous.
The dynamic rule is specified as follows: each time step is thought of as one generation of
the discrete evolutionary time, where every node i of the system plays with its nearest neighbors
and accumulates the payoffs obtained during the round, say Pi. Then, individuals are allowed to
synchronously change their strategies by comparing the payoffs they accumulated in the previous
generation with that of a neighbor j chosen at random. If Pi > Pj , player i keeps the same
strategy for the next time step, when it will play again with all of its neighborhood. On the
contrary, whenever Pj > Pi, i adopts the strategy of j with probability Πi→j = β(Pj −Pi), where
β−1 = max{ki, kj}b. Note that this dynamic rule, though stochastic, does not allow the adoption
of irrational strategy, i.e. Πi→j = 0 whenever Pj ≤ Pi.
Let us now specify precisely the family of networks on top of which the evolutionary PD game
is evolved. Strategists are located on the vertices of a fixed graph of average connectivity 〈k〉 = 4.
The heterogeneity of the networks is controlled by tuning a single parameter α, so that when
α = 0 the networks are of the Erdo¨s-Renyi class of random graphs, and when α = 1 they are
of the Baraba´si-Albert (BA) [47] scale-free networks class. Let’s first describe the algorithm to
construct a BA network of size N . In this case, one starts from a fully connected set of m0 nodes
and at each time step a new node is linked to m = 2 nodes preferentially chosen, namely, the
probability that node i receives one new link is proportional to its degree, ki/
∑
j kj . Avoiding
multiple connections and iterating the preferential attachment rule N − m0 times a SF network
with an exponent γ = 3 is generated. On the other hand, random single-scale networks are built
up following the standard recipe to generate ER networks [36]. Finally, networks with an interme-
diate degree of heterogeneity can be built following the recipe introduced in [48]. The algorithm
combines the mechanisms of preferential (with probability α) and uniform random linking (1−α)
in such a way that starting from α = 0 and increasing its value, the networks generated are suc-
cessively more homogeneous with a heavy tail whose exponent is equal to (α = 0) or larger than
(α > 0) γ = 3.
From any initial condition {si(t = 0)}, i = 1, ..., N (where si = 1 if node i is an instantaneous
cooperator and si = 0 if defector), and after many generations, the instantaneous fraction of coop-
erators c(t) = N−1
∑
i si(t) in the stochastic trajectory, {si(t)}, fluctuates around a well-defined
mean value c¯, which depends on the parameter b, as well as on the particular initial condition.
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The transient time t0 that we allow before measuring observable quantities is assured to be larger
than the one required for the stationarity of c¯ (see below). The average level of cooperation 〈c〉
is computed as the average of c¯ over initial conditions (of fixed fraction ρ0 of cooperators), and
network realizations. We numerically identify as pure cooperators all those individuals that always
cooperate, for all times larger than the transient time t0. Pure defectors are those that always defect
for any t > t0. Fluctuating nodes are those that are neither pure cooperators nor pure defectors.
In this way we estimate the measure of the partition sets (C, D, F ). To inspect the connectedness
of the sets of pure strategists, C and D, we define cooperator (CC) and defector cores (DC) as
clusters (connected subgraphs) fully composed by pure cooperators and defectors, respectively,
their numbers being denoted by Ncc and Ndc. It is easy to realize that for generic (irrational) b
values, no pure defector can be a neighbor of a pure cooperator, so that the presence of both types
of nodes in the long-term stochastic trajectory, assures the existence of fluctuating nodes.
The time scale of microscopic invasion processes (updating rule) is controlled by β−1, which
is the highest connectivity of pair’s nodes; this makes that very high payoff of a hub due to its
very high k is sensibly balanced by β ∝ k−1 [39], with the side effect that the invasion processes
from and to hubs are slowed down, if hub’s (and neighbor’s) payoff is much smaller than its con-
nectivity k. On the other hand, the transient time t0 should be greater than characteristic fixation
times for nodes in C and D, if one is interested in measuring observable quantities associated to
the partition. Fixation times of strategies at the nodes in turn, obviously depends on the initial
conditions (i.e., on ρ0, the initial fraction of cooperators), so that henceforth in the simulations we
use a variable time window, t0, of at least 104 generations as the transient time. Once the system
is at (a fluctuating) equilibrium regarding stationarity of 〈c〉, we let the dynamics evolve for 104
additional time steps, while measuring quantities. All the results have been averaged over at least
103 different realizations of the networks and initial conditions. Most of the results shown below
correspond to N = 4000 nodes, though other values have been also used; we will comment on
this issue in the concluding section.
III. DEPENDENCE ON THE INITIAL CONDITIONS
The initial conditions for the stochastic trajectories that we consider here are such that an initial
number ρ0N of nodes (0 < ρ0 < 1) are randomly chosen as cooperators. In Fig. 1 we show,
for some values of the parameter b, how the stationary value of 〈c〉 depends on the initial fraction
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FIG. 1: Average cooperation level in ER networks (top panel) and BA networks (bottom panel) as a function
of the initial concentration ρo and several values of b as indicated. The size of the networks is N = 4000
nodes and 〈k〉 = 4.
ρ0 of cooperators for ER and BA networks. As seen in that figure, 〈c〉 typically increases with
ρ0 until saturation is reached much before ρ0 approaches 1. One observes that saturation occurs
sooner for smaller values of b. These features are common for both classes of networks. However
some details of the 〈c〉(ρ0) curves are different: First, for ER networks, the departure from zero of
〈c〉(ρ0) occurs, as b increases, only above some (b-dependent) threshold value of the initial fraction
of cooperators; on the contrary, for BA networks 〈c〉 departs from zero as soon as ρ0 > 0, at all
values of b inside the coexistence region. Second, saturation is more perfect for ER networks,
while for BA graphs the plateau in the 〈c〉(ρ0) curve has some small positive slope.
The variation with the game parameter b of the stationary (asymptotic) average cooperation,
〈c〉(b), for several values of ρ0, is shown in Fig. 2 for ER graphs (upper panel) and BA networks
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FIG. 2: Average cooperation level in ER (top) and SF (bottom) networks as a function of b and different
initial concentration of cooperators ρ0 as indicated. The size of the networks is N = 4000 nodes and
〈k〉 = 4. The scale-free network is a BA graph whose P (k) ∼ k−3.
(lower panel). In the case of ER networks, different initial concentrations ρ0 produce a family of
curves that mainly differs in their tails in such a way that the larger the value of ρ0, the slower
the decay of 〈c〉 as b increases, in correspondence with the perfect saturation of 〈c〉(ρ0) at fixed b
observed in Fig. 1. On the other hand, in BA networks the effects of different initial conditions
are appreciated in the whole range of b values. We thus see that degree heterogeneity not only
favors the survival of cooperation, but also makes the value of the average cooperation, at fixed
b value, more dependent on initial conditions. In this regard one should note that ER networks,
often termed as homogeneous, have indeed some small heterogeneity, i.e. the degree distribution
density has a non-zero variance. In fact, the average level of cooperation in ER networks is clearly
enhanced with respect to random regular networks (where all the nodes have exactly the same
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FIG. 3: Fraction of pure strategists in ER (top) and SF (bottom) networks as a function of b and several
values of ρ0. Network parameters are those of Fig. 2.
degree k), see e.g. [24]. In other words, even the small amounts of heterogeneity of ER networks,
are enough to allow for cooperation-promoting feedback mechanisms to work.
As stated in the introductory section I, it has been reported in [41] that for any asymptotic
trajectory there is a partition of the network into three sets, namely the set C of pure cooperator
nodes, the set D of pure defector nodes, and the set F of fluctuating nodes. From now on we
denote by ρc = 〈µ(C)〉 the measure (relative size) of the set of pure cooperators (averaged over
initial conditions and network realizations), and by ρd = 〈µ(D)〉 that of the set of pure defectors.
The behavior of ρc and ρd versus the game parameter b is plotted in Fig. 3 for different initial
distributions as a function of the parameter b.
The first remarkable result is that in ER networks, the density of pure cooperators does not
depend on ρ0 for the whole range of b values, in sharp contrast to the above mentioned results for
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the tails of the average level of cooperation 〈c〉(b) (see Fig. 2). As anticipated in the introduction
(see Eq. 1), there are two additive contributions to the average fraction 〈c〉 of cooperators, namely
the measure ρc of the set of pure cooperators, and the overall fraction of time T¯c spent by fluctuating
nodes as cooperators, weighted by the relative size ρf = 〈µ(F)〉 of the fluctuating set:
〈c〉 = ρc + ρf T¯c (3)
Though the first contribution is, for ER networks, independent of ρ0, the second one does indeed
depend on initial conditions, as inferred from Fig. 2 and the relation ρc+ ρd+ ρf = 1. High initial
concentrations of cooperators favor the fluctuating setF at the expense of pure defectors, while the
number of nodes where fixation of cooperative strategy occurs remains largely unaffected: ρc is
thus being mainly determined by the network structural features. For example, in our simulations,
for large values of b where ρc is very small, we have observed that the pure cooperator nodes
form cycles. The fixation of cooperation in these structures is assured if none of their elements is
linked to a fluctuating individual that, while playing as a defector, is coupled to more than kc/b
cooperators, where kc is the number of cooperators attached to the element. The number of such
structures is finite in ER graphs, but as soon as their vertices are occupied by cooperators, they
will be immune to defectors invasion.
The bottom panel of Figure. 3 shows the results obtained for BA networks. Regarding the
proportion of pure cooperators, one may differentiate two regimes: For b < 1.7, there is a moderate
dependence of ρc on ρ0, while ρc is almost independent of ρ0 for larger values of b. This behavior
correlates well with our observations [49] on the distribution of strategists inside the degree classes.
In the first range, pure cooperators are present in all k-classes and fluctuating individuals are almost
homogeneously disseminated over low-to-intermediate k classes. However, for b > 1.7, there is
a b-dependent value of k, say k∗, such that k-classes are fully occupied by pure cooperators if
k > k∗ while basically no pure cooperators are found in lower k-classes. In this second range,
where the degree-strategy correlations are strong, the influence of ρ0 on the asymptotic proportion
of pure cooperators is very small.
While as discussed in previous paragraphs, the proportion of pure cooperators is either inde-
pendent (ER) or slightly dependent (BA) on initial concentration ρ0, the measures of the other sets
in the partition, F and D, are indeed more influenced by the initial conditions. The dependence of
ρd on ρ0 for BA and ER networks is qualitatively the same, that is, the proportion of pure defectors
is favored (at the expense of the fluctuating set) by a higher initial proportion of defectors. This
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FIG. 4: Dependence with b of the number of cooperator (Ncc) and defector (Ndc) cores in ER graphs (top)
and BA (bottom) networks for different values of ρ0.
is consistent with the lack of degree preference (correlation) of pure defectors, which cannot take
distinctive advantage of degree inhomogeneity: The higher their instantaneous payoff, the more
likely they invade neighboring nodes, which has the effect of diminishing their future payoff.
Finally, we analyze the connectedness of the pure strategists sets, as measured by the number
of cooperator cores Ncc, and defector cores Ndc. For BA networks, and ρ0 = 1/2, we had reported
in [41] the result that for all values of b where C is not an empty set, it is connected, i.e. Ncc = 1.
This result turns out to be independent of ρ0 (see Fig. 4): There is only one cooperator core in BA
networks, which contains always the most connected nodes, for any initial fraction of cooperators.
The grouping of pure cooperators into a single connected set C allows to keep a significant fraction
of pure cooperators isolated from contacts with fluctuating nodes. This ”Eden of cooperation” in-
side C provides a safe source of benefits to the individuals in the frontier, reinforcing the resilience
to invasion of the set. Pure defectors, on the contrary, do not benefit from grouping together, and
the set D appears fragmented into several defector cores. Note that for values of b ≃ 1, where the
set D is empty, Ndc = 0, while for very high values of b defection reaches fixation in the whole
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FIG. 5: Average cooperation level and densities of strategists as a function of b for different values of α.
α = 0 corresponds to a BA network while α = 1 generates an ER graph. In this case, the networks are
made up of N = 2000 nodes and 〈k〉 = 4. See the main text for further details.
network, so that Ndc = 1. Thus, Ndc(b) must increase first and then decrease to 1. In Fig. 4 we
show the computed Ndc(b) curves for BA networks for several values of ρ0. It is remarkable that
these curves almost collapse, in spite of the fact that the fraction ρd of pure defectors does indeed
depend on ρ0, a numerical fact for which we have not found a plausible explanation.
In Fig. 4 we also show for ER graphs Ncc(b) and Ndc(b), for different values of ρ0. Regarding
the number of cooperator cores, we see that except in the small range 1.4 < b < 1.6, the different
curves coincide, in fair agreement with the independence of ρc on initial conditions. Note that in
the small interval where they do not coincide, the fraction ρc of pure cooperators is below 1%, for
all values of ρ0. On the other hand, we see that for higher initial proportion ρ0 of cooperators, the
set D is more fragmented and also that Ndc reaches its maximal values at higher values of b.
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IV. INFLUENCE OF THE DEGREE OF HETEROGENEITY
In order to inspect how the results depend on the distribution of nodes’ degrees, we have moni-
tored the same magnitudes studied throughout this paper when the value of α varies between 0 and
1. As introduced above, this makes the networks less heterogeneous as α grows and approaches
1. Figure 5 shows, from left to the right, the average level of cooperation 〈c〉, the density of pure
cooperators ρc and the density of pure defectors ρd as a function of b for several values of α. In
this case, the initial distribution of cooperators was set to ρ0 = 1/2, i.e., the nodes have the same
probability to cooperate or defect at t = 0. The results show that indeed the densities of pure
strategists and the average level of cooperation do depend on α, that is to say, the figure confirms
the role played by the underlying topology. The more homogeneous the graph is, the smaller the
level of cooperation in the system. Moreover, the transition for different values of α is smooth and
does not exhibit an abrupt crossover from one kind of behavior (α = 0) to the other (α = 1).
We have also explored how nodes where strategies have reached fixation are organized into
clusters of cooperation and defection as a function of α. Figure 6 summarizes our computations
for the number of cooperator cores. In this case, we have represented Ncc as a function of 1 − ρc
(that grows with b) in order to have the same scale for different values of α until cooperation
breaks down. The observed dependence with α is again smooth and no abrupt change in the
behavior of this magnitude occurs. It is worth stressing that as soon as the underlying network
departs from the limit α = 0 corresponding to a BA scale-free network (whose P (k) ∼ k−3),
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the number of CC slightly differs from 1. This means that some realizations give rise to more
than one cluster of CC. The probability to have such realizations is very small, but in principle,
they are possible. As α is further increased beyond zero, it is clear that pure cooperators do not
organize anymore into a single cooperator core. We think that this deviation is due to the fact
that when α > 0 the exponent γ of the underlying network, which still is a scale-free degree
distribution, is larger that 3. It is known that this value of γ marks the frontier of two different
behaviors when dynamical processes are run on top of complex heterogeneous networks [50, 51].
This is the case, for instance, of epidemic spreading. For 2 < γ ≤ 3, the second moment of the
degree distribution P (k) diverges in the thermodynamic limit, while it is finite if γ > 3. As the
critical properties of the system are determined by the ratio between the first (that remains finite
for γ > 2) and the second moment, the divergence of the latter when N → ∞ and 2 < γ ≤ 3,
makes the epidemic threshold null. On the contrary, when the process takes place in networks
whose γ > 3, the epidemic threshold is recovered, although no singular behavior is associated to
the critical point [50, 51]. We expect that a similar phenomenology is behind the results shown in
Fig. 6. It would be very interesting to test this hypothesis by simulating the PD implemented here
on top of scale-free networks with an exponent in between 2 and 3. As a byproduct, such a study
may guide our search of analytical insights and provides a deeper understanding of what drives
the structural organization of cooperation at the microscopic level.
V. CONCLUSIONS
Scale-free-structured populations offer to the cooperative strategy the opportunity of positive
feedback evolutionary mechanisms making cooperation a most fitted overall strategy, in spite of
not being a best reply to itself in one-time step. We have shown here that the enhancement of co-
operation due to the heterogeneity of the structure of connections among agents is robust against
variation of initial conditions (initial concentration ρ0 of cooperators): While both the measure of
the set C where cooperation reaches fixation, and its connectedness properties are either indepen-
dent or only slightly dependent on ρ0, the measure of the fluctuating set F and the set D where
defection is fixed, both show a clear dependence on initial conditions, for defection cannot profit
from degree heterogeneity. On the other hand, the characteristics of the asymptotic evolutionary
states of the Prisoner’s Dilemma analyzed here, show a smooth variation when the heterogeneity
of the network of interconnections is one-parametric tuned from Poissonian to scale-free, demon-
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strating a strong correlation between heterogeneity and cooperation enhancement.
Though the numerical results presented here correspond to network sizes N = 4000 (in section
III) and N = 2000 (section IV), we have study also larger networks (up to N = 104), with no
qualitative differences in the results. The increase of network size, while keeping constant the
average degree 〈k〉, turns out to be beneficial for cooperation, due to the fact that it has the effect
of increasing the maximal degree, and thus the range of degree values. This further confirms how
efficiently cooperation takes advantage from degree heterogeneity.
The robustness of these results against game parameters variation will be analyzed elsewhere
[49], one should expect that the network partition (C, D, F ) along asymptotics stochastic trajec-
tories is generic in evolutionary game dynamics in graphs, for the kind of stochastic updating rule
considered here. Our results also suggest that more works are needed in order to fully characterize
the behavior of the PD game in heterogeneous graphs. The use of real networks, with empha-
sis on the role of mesoscopic (community) structures is addressed in [46]. Of particular interest
would be to perform the sort of analysis carried out here in scale-free networks with an exponent
2 < γ < 3, which will make it feasible to connect evolutionary dynamics with other dynamical
processes taking place on top of scale-free networks. Our hope is that this sort of study might
provide a deeper understanding of what is going on at the microscopic level and might help to
comprehend what universal mechanisms drive the evolution of complex heterogeneous networks
as well as the reasons behind their ubiquitous presence in nature.
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